This is a preliminary list of publications generated by grant support from the BQFW project. Grants ranged from a few months to two years (and longer, in the case of the director). This list will be updated.

Roy F. Baumeister and Joshua Knobe

Articles:

Baumeister, R. F. and Vonasch, A. J., “Self-organization as conceptual key to understanding free will,” AJOB Neuroscience, 2, (2011): 44-46.

Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., and Schmeichel, B. J., “Motivation, personal beliefs, and limited resources all contribute to self-control,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48, (2012): 943–947.

Masicampo, E. J. and Baumeister, R. F., “Committed but closed-minded: When making a specific plan for a goal hinders success,” Social Cognition, 30, (2012): 37-55.

Hofmann, W., Vohs, K. D. and Baumeister, R. F., “What People Desire, Feel Conflicted About, and Try to Resist in Everyday Life,” Psychological Science, 23, (2012): 582–588.

Gailliot, M. T., Gitter, S. A., Baker, M. D. and Baumeister, R. F., “Breaking the rules: Low trait or state self-control increases norm violations,” Psychology, 12, (2012): 1074-1083.

Baumeister, R. F. and Vonasch, A. J., “Is the essence of morality mind perception, self-regulation, free will, or culture?” Psychological Inquiry, 23, (2012): 134-136.

Baumeister, R. F., and Brewer, L. E., “Believing versus disbelieving in free will: Correlates and consequences,” Personality and Social Psychology Compass, 6/10, (2012): 736-745.

Alquist, J. L. and Baumeister, R. F., “Self-control: Limited resources and extensive benefits,” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 3, (2012): 419-423.

Baumeister, R. F., “Self-control, fluctuating willpower, and forensic practice,” British Journal of Forensic Psychology, 15, (2013): 85-96.

Masicampo, E. J. and Baumeister, R. F., “Conscious thought does not guide moment-to-moment actions — It serves social and cultural functions,” Frontiers in psychology, 4, (2013): 478.

Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. E., and Baumeister, R. F., “Determined to conform: Disbelief in free will increases conformity,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 49, (2013): 80–86.

Ainsworth, S. E. and Baumeister, R. F., “Cooperation and fairness depend on self-regulation,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 36, (2013): 79-80.

Clark, C. J., Luguri, J. B., Ditto, P. H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A. F., & Baumeister, R. F., “Free to punish: A motivated account of free will belief.” Journal of personality and social psychology, 106, (2014): 501-513.

Baumeister, R. F., “Constructing a scientific theory of free will,” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral psychology (Vol. 4): Free will and responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (forthcoming).

Bertrams, A., Englert, C., Dickhäuser, O., and Baumeister, R.F., “Role of self-control strength in the relation between anxiety and cognitive performance,” Emotion (forthcoming).

Baumeister, R. F., “Grateful responses to thoughtful comments by Holton, Payne, and Cameron,” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral psychology (Vol. 4): Free will and responsibility. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (forthcoming).

Baumeister, R. F. and Bargh, J. A., “Conscious and unconscious: Toward an integrative understanding of human mental life and action,” In J. Sherman, B. Gawronski, and Y. Trope, eds. Dual process theories of the social mind. New York: Guilford Press (forthcoming).

Baumeister, R.F., Clark, C., & Luguri, J., “Free will: Belief and reality,” In A. Mele ed. Surrounding free will. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Baumeister, R.F., Schmeichel, B.J., and DeWall, C.N., “Creativity and consciousness: Evidence from psychology experiments,” In E. Paul, ed. The philosophy of creativity. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., and Masicampo, E., “Maybe it helps to be conscious, after all: Commentary on Newell and Shanks,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences (forthcoming).

Daly, M. Baumeister, R.F., Delany, L., and MacLachlan, M., “Self-control and its relation to emotions and psychobiology: Evidence from a Day Reconstruction Method study,” Journal of Behavioral Medicine (forthcoming).

Gröpel, P., Baumeister, R.F. and Beckmann, J., “Action versus state orientation and self-control performance after depletion,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin (forthcoming).

Hofmann, W., Vohs, K.D., Fisher, R. and Baumeister, R.F., “Yes, but are they happy? Effects of trait self-control on affective well-being and life satisfaction,” Journal of Personality (forthcoming).

Knobe, J., “Free will and the scientific vision,” In E. Machery, and E. O’Neill, (eds.), Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge (forthcoming).

Vonasch, A. J. and Baumeister, R. F., “Implications of free will beliefs for basic theory and societal benefit: Critique and implications for social psychology,” British Journal of Social Psychology (forthcoming).

Crescioni, A.W., Baumeister, R.F., Ainsworth, S.E., Ent, M.R., and Lambert, N.M., “Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will,” (under review).

Alquist, J. L., Ainsworth, S. Baumeister, R. F., Daly, M., and Stillman, T., “The making of might-have-beens: Effects of beliefs about free will on counterfactual thinking,” (under review).

Ent, M.R. and Baumeister, R.F., “Embodied free will beliefs: Some effects of physical states on metaphysical opinions,” (under review).

Phillips, J. and Shaw, A., “Manipulating morality: Third-party intentions alter moral judgments by changing causal reasoning,” (under review).

Vohs, K. D., Baumeister, R. F., Vonasch, A., Pocheptsova, A., and Dhar, R., “Self-control resource depletion impairs active initiative and thus produces passivity,” (under review).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

Baumeister, R.F., “Do you really have free will?” Slate.com, (Sept 25, 2013). http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/09/free_will_debate_what_does_free_will_mean_and_how_did_it_evolve.html

Gunnar Björnsson

Articles:

Björnsson, G. and Pereboom, D., “Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing,” In Moral Psychology: Free Will and Moral Responsibility Vol 4. W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Cambridge MA: MIT Press (2014), 27-35.

“Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency,” In Surrounding Free Will. A. R. Mele ed. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Björnsson, G., and Pereboom, D., “Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility,” In Companion to Experimental Philosophy, Justin Sytsma and Wesley Buckwalter (eds.) Blackwell (forthcoming).

“Outsourcing depth: Problems for deep self accounts of responsibility judgments and manipulation worries,” (under review).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

“Featured Author” on Flickers of Freedom, (Sept 27, 2013). http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/featured-author-gunnar-björnsson/

Randolph Clarke

Book – Author:

Clarke, R. Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Articles:

“Freedom, Responsibility, and Omitting to Act,” Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, David Palmer, ed. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)

“Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission,” In Surrounding Free Will, A. Mele, ed. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Jesse Couenhoven

Books – Author:

Stricken by Sin, Cured by Christ. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Predestination: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: T&T Clark Bloomsbury, forthcoming.

Articles:

“Fodge-ogs and HedgeOxes,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 81.3 (2013): 586-591.

“The Augustinian Background of Luther’s Bondage of the Will,” On the Apocalyptic and Human Agency: Conversations with Augustine of Hippo and Martin Luther. K. Stierna, ed. Cambridge Scholars Press (forthcoming).

“The Protestant Reformation,” Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy. M. Pakaluk and J. Timmermann, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

“Volitionism, Normativity, and the Problem of God’s Immutable Freedom,” Free Will and Theism. K. Timpe and D. Speak, eds. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

“Predestination,” Vocabulary for the Study of Religion. R. Segal, ed. Brill Press (forthcoming).

“Saint Augustine,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFollette, ed. Blackwell Press (2013).

John Martin Fischer

Book – Editor:

Fischer, J. M., and Todd, P. eds. Freedom, Foreknowledge, and Fatalism. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Alison Gopnik and Tamar Kushnir

Articles:

Gopnik, A., “The Origins and Development of Our Conception of Free Will,” In Surrounding Free Will, A. Mele, ed. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Kushnir, T., Chernyak, N., Seiver, E., Gopnik, A., Wellman, H., “Developing intuitions about free will between ages four and six,” Cognition, (submitted).

W. Matthews Grant

Book – Editor:

Edited volume coming from the Theology of Free Will conference, which is currently under consideration by Oxford University Press.

Articles:

“Divine Universal Causality without Occasionalism (and with Agent Causality),” Free Will and Theism. K. Timpe and D. Speak, eds. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“The Privation Account of Moral Evil: A Defense,” International Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming).

“Moral Evil, Privation, and God,” (under review).

Patrick Haggard and Nick Chater

Articles:

Olivola, C. Y., and Shafir, E., “The martyrdom effect: When pain and effort increase prosocial contributions,” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 26, (2013): 91–105.

Filevich, E. and Haggard, P., “Persistence of internal representations of alternative voluntary actions,” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4, (2013): 202.

Salvaris, M. and Haggard, P., “Decoding free decisions in the human brain?” PLoS One, (2014)

Salvaris, M. and Haggard, P., “Decoding intentions at sensorimotor timescales,” PLoS One, (forthcoming).

Chater, N. and Oaksford, M., “Programs as causal models: Speculations on mental programs and mental representation,” Cognitive Science (forthcoming).

Misyak, J. and Chater, N., “Virtual bargaining: A theory of social decision making,” (under review).

David Hunt

Articles:

Hunt, D. and Shabo, S., “Frankfurt Cases and the (In)significance of Timing: A Defense of the Buffering Strategy” Philosophical Studies 164 (2012): 1-24.

“God’s Extended Mind,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (2013): 1-16.

Jenann Ismael

Articles:

“On Being Someone,” In A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“On Whether the Atemporal Conception of the World is also Amodal,” in Cosmological and Psychological Time, Y. Abrams, ed. Springer (forthcoming).

“Passage, Flow, and the Logic of Temporal Perspectives,” in The Nature of Time, The Time of Nature, C. Bouton and P. Hunemann, ed. University of Chicago Press (forthcoming).

“A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Modality,” in Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Z. Yudall and M. Slater, eds. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Christof Koch, Gideon Yaffe, Adam Mamelak, Uri Maoz, and Ram Rivlin

Articles:

Maoz, U., Ye, S., Ross, I. B., Mamelak, A. N., & Koch, C., “Predicting Action Content On‐Line and in Real Time before Action Onset – an Intracranial Human Study,” Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), 25. (2012).

Maoz, U., Rutishauser, U., Kim, S., Cai, X., Lee, D., and Koch, C., “Predeliberation activity in prefrontal cortex and striatum and the prediction of subsequent value judgment,” Frontiers in neuroscience, 7, 225 (2013).

Maoz, U., & Flash, T., “Spatial constant equi‐affine speed and motion perception” Journal of Neurophysiology, 111 (2014):336-349.

Maoz, U. and Yaffe, G., “Cognitive Neuroscience and Criminal Responsibility,” In M. Gazzaniga, ed. Cognitive Neuroscience: The Biology of the Mind (Fifth Edition) (2014).

Maoz, U., Mudrik, L., Rivlin, R., Ross, I. B., Mamelak, A. N., and Yaffe, G., “On reporting the onset of the intention to move,” In A. Mele ed. Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming).

Mudrik, L. and Maoz, U., “’Me & my brain’: Exposing neuroscience’s closet dualism in studies of consciousness and free will” (submitted).

Hakwan Lau and Tim Bayne

Articles:

Lau, H. and Rosenthal, D., “Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15(8) (2011):365-73.

De Lange, F., Rahnev, D., Donner, T., and Lau, H., “Pre-stimulus oscillatory activity in motor cortex reflects perceptual expectations,” Journal of Neuroscience 33(4) (2013):1400-10.

Maniscalco, B. and Lau, H., “A signal detection theoretic method for estimating metacognitive sensitivity from confidence ratings,” Consciousness & Cognition. 21(1) (2012):422-30.

Rahnev, D. A., Huang, E., and Lau, H., “Subliminal stimuli in the near absence of attention influence top-down cognitive control,” Attention Perception & Psychophysics. 74(3) (2012): 521-32.

Rahnev, D. A., Maniscalco, B., Luber, B., Lau, H., and Lisanby, S. H., “Direct injection of noise to the visual cortex decreases accuracy but increases decision confidence,” Journal of Neurophysiology. 107(6) (2012): 1556-63.

Ko, Y. D. and Lau, H., “A detection theoretic explanation of blindsight suggests a link between conscious perception and metacognition,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 367(1594) (2012):1401-11.

Maniscalo, B., Bang, J. W., Iravani, L., Camps-Febrer, F., and Lau, H., “Does response interference depend on the subjective visibility of flanker distractors?” Attention Perception & Psychophysics, 74(5) (2012):841-51.

Brian Leftow

Articles:

“God’s Deontic Perfection,” Res Philosophica 90 (2013): 69-95.

“Tempting God,” Faith and Philosophy 31 (2014): 3-24.

“Infinite Goodness,” in B. Gocke, ed. The Infinity of God, University of Notre Dame Press, (forthcoming).

Bertram F. Malle and Andrew E. Monroe

Articles:

Roskies, A. L. and Malle, B. F., “A Strawsonian look at desert.” Philosophical Explorations, 16 (2013): 133-152.

Monroe, A. E.,Dillon, K. D., and Malle, B. F., “Bringing free will down to earth: People’s psychological concept of free will and its role in moral judgment,” Consciousness and Cognition. 27 (2014): 100-108.

Baumeister, R.F. and Monroe, A. E., “Recent research on free will: Conceptualizations, beliefs, and processes,” In Olson, J. M. and Zanna, M. P., eds. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 50 (2014): 1-52.

Monroe, A. E. and Malle, B. F., “Free will without metaphysics.” In A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

Monroe, A. E., “Free will without metaphysics.” In-Mind. (2014, April 28). http://www.in-mind.org/blog/post/free-will-without-metaphysics

Hugh McCann

Articles:

“Making Decisions.” In E. Sosa, E. Villanueva, and B. Brogaard, eds. Philosophical Issues 22 (2012): 246-63.

“Action.” In H. LaFollette, ed. International Encyclopedia of Ethics. London: Wiley-Blackwell, (2013): 38-48.

“Action Individuation.” In E. LePore and K. Ludwig, eds. A Companion to Donald Davidson. London: Wiley-Blackwell, (2014): 48-61.

Alfred Mele

Books – Author:

Backsliding. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

A Dialogue on Free Will and Science. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Free. Why Science Hasn’t Disproved Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Book – Editor:

Surrounding Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

Articles:

“Moral Psychology,” in C. Miller, ed. The Continuum Companion to Ethics. Continuum (2011), 98-118.

“Free Will and Science,” in R. Kane, ed. Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. Oxford University Press (2011), 499-514.

Stillman, T., Baumeister, R., and Mele, A., “Free Will in Everyday Life: Autobiographical Accounts of Free and Unfree Actions,” Philosophical Psychology 24 (2011): 381-394.

“Libet on Free Will: Readiness Potentials, Decisions, and Awareness,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong and L. Nadel, eds. Conscious Will and Responsibility. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 23-33.

“Self-Control in Action,” in S. Gallagher, ed. Oxford Handbook of the Self. Oxford University Press (2011), pp. 465-486.

“Surrounding Free Will: A Response to Baumeister, Crescioni, and Alquist,” Neuroethics 4: (2011): 25-29.

“Consciousness in Action: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, Data, and Inferences,” in J. Larrazabal, ed. Cognition, Reasoning, Emotion, and Action. University of the Basque Country Press (2012), 87-98.

“Folk Conceptions of Intentional Action,” Philosophical Issues 22 (2012): 281-297.

“Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice,” American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2012): 369-379.

“Crimes of Negligence: Attempting and Succeeding,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (2012): 387-398.

“Another Scientific Threat to Free Will?” Monist 95 (2012): 422-440.

“Autonomy and Neuroscience,” in L. Radoilska, ed. Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press (2012): 26-43.

“When Are We Self-Deceived?” Humana.Mente Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (2012): 1–15.

“Libertarianism and Human Agency,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2013): 72-92.

“Is What You Decide Ever up to You?” in I. Haji and J. Caouette, eds. Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Cambridge Scholars Publishing (2013), 74-97.

“Unconscious Decisions and Free Will,” Philosophical Psychology 26 (2013): 777-789.

“Actions, Explanations, and Causes,” in G. D’Oro and C. Sandis, eds. Reasons and Causes: Causalism and Anti-Causalism in the Philosophy of Action, Palgrave Macmillan (2013), 160-174.

“Free Will and Neuroscience,” Philosophic Exchange 43 (2013): 1-17.

“Manipulation, Moral Responsibility, and Bullet Biting,” Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 167-184.

“Moral Responsibility, Manipulation, and Minutelings,” Journal of Ethics 17 (2013): 153-166.

Mele, A. and Shepherd, J., “Situationism and Agency,” Journal of Practical Ethics 1 (2013): 62-83.

“Free Will, Science, and Punishment,” in T. Nadelhoffer, ed. The Future of Punishment, Oxford University Press (2013), 177-191.

“Vetoing and Consciousness,” in A. Clark, J. Kiverstein, and T. Vierkant eds. Decomposing the Will, Oxford University Press (2013), 73-86.

“Moral Responsibility and the Continuation Problem,” Philosophical Studies 162 (2013): 237-255.

“Free Will and Neuroscience: Revisiting Libet’s Studies,” in A. Suarez and P. Adams, eds. Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer (2013), 195-207.

“Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 195-207.

“Reply to Nadelhoffer and Vargas,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology, Volume 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. MIT Press (2014), 227-233.

“The Single Phenomenon View and Experimental Philosophy,” in M. Vargas and G. Yaffe, eds. Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman, Oxford University Press (2014), 38-55.

“Self-Control, Motivational Strength, and Exposure Therapy,” Philosophical Studies (forthcoming).

“Libet and the Timing of the Will,” in J. Clausen and N. Levy, eds. Handbook of Neuroethics, Springer (forthcoming).

“Kane, Luck, and Control,” in D. Palmer, ed. Libertarian Free Will, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

“Free Will,” The Philosophers’ Magazine 50 (2010, 3rd quarter), 86-87.

“Chance, Choice, and Freedom,” The Philosophers’ Magazine (2011, 4th quarter) 55: 61-65.

“The Case Against the Case Against Free Will.” The Chronicle of Higher Education, The Chronicle Review, 3-18-2012. http://chronicle.com/article/Alfred-R-Mele-The-Case/131166/

Interview with 3:AM Magazine. February, 2012. http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/the-4million-dollar-philosopher/

“Premium, Mid-Grade and Regular Free Will Fuel Accountability,” Phi Kappa Phi Forum 92.1 2012, 11-12.

“Responsibility Without Free Will?” Review of M. Gazzaniga, Who’s in Charge? Free Will and the Science of the Brain (HarperCollins, 2011), BioScience 62 (2012): 313-14.

Interview on Free Will, Methode 2 (2013): 112-116.

“Agency,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences, in B. Kaldis, ed. Sage, 2013, 11-14.

“Free Will,” International Encyclopedia of Ethics, H. LaFolette, ed. Blackwell, 2013, 2027-37.

“Author Q & A: Alfred Mele Explains How We Act Against Our Better Judgements,” The Philosophers’ Magazine (2013, 1st Quarter) 60: 125-26.

Adina L. Roskies

Articles:

Roskies, A.L., “Monkey decision-making as a model for human decision-making.” In A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. (forthcoming).

Roskies, A. L., “How does the neuroscience of decision making bear on our understanding of moral responsibility and free will?” Current Opinions in Neurobiology, 22 (2012): 1–5.

Shadlen, M. N. and Roskies, A. L., “The neurobiology of decision making and responsibility: Reconciling mechanism and mindedness” Frontiers in Neuroscience, 6: 56 (2012): 1-12.

Roskies, A. L., “Don’t panic: On being a causa sui” Philosophical Perspectives, 26 (2012): 323-342.

Carolina Sartorio

Books – Author:

Sartorio, C., Causation and Free Will Oxford University Press (Under review).

Articles:

“Making a Difference in a Deterministic World,” Philosophical Review 122(2) (2013): 189-214

“The Problem of Determinism and Free Will is Not the Problem of Determinism and Free Will,” in Surrounding Free Will, A. Mele, ed. New York: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

“Actual Sequence Freedom,” in F. Bacchini, S. Caputo, and M. Dell’Utri, eds. New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing (forthcoming).

“Sensitivity to Reasons and Actual Sequences,” in D. Shoemaker, ed. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

Interview on Free Will, Methode 3 (2013): 179-185

“Featured Author” on Flickers of Freedom, (Aug 22, 2013) http://philosophycommons.typepad.com/flickers_of_freedom/featured-author-carolina-sartorio/

Haim Sompolinsky, Ariel Furstenberg, and Leon Y. Deouell

Articles:

Furstenberg, A., “Proximal Intentions, Non-Executed Proximal Intentions and Change of Intentions,” Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 33:1 (2014): 13-22.

Furstenberg, A., Deouell, L. Y., Sompolinsky, H., “Change of Intention in ‘Picking’ Situations” In Surrounding Free Will, A. Mele, ed. Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Published Abstracts:

Furstenberg, A., Bresska, A., Deouell, L. Y., Sompolinsky, H., “Neural signature of change of intentions,” Abstracts of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Israel Society for Neuroscience & The First Binational Australian-Israeli Meeting in Neuroscience. Journal of Molecular Neuroscience. (2013) doi: 10.1007/s12031-012-9923-1

Ramaswamy, V., Furstenberg, A., Breska, A., Deouell, L.Y., Sompolinsky, H., “Single-trial decoding of intention from EEG,” Abstracts of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Israel Society for Neuroscience & The First Binational Australian-Israeli Meeting in Neuroscience. Journal of Molecular Neuroscience. (2013) doi: 10.1007/s12031-012-9923-1

Furstenberg, A., Deouell, L. Y., Sompolinsky, H., “A neural network model of intentions within free choice and instructed conditions,” Abstracts of the 22st Annual Meeting of the Israel Society for Neuroscience & the 2nd Binational Italian-Israeli Neuroscience Meeting. Journal of Molecular Neuroscience. (2014) doi: 10.1007/s12031-014-0252-4

Peter Tse, Thalia Wheatley, Adina Roskies, and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong

Book – Author:

Tse, P. U. The neural basis of free will: Criterial Causation, MIT Press (2013).

Articles:

Schlegel, A., Alexander, P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Tse, P.U., Wheatley, T., “Barking up the Wrong Free: Readiness potentials reflect processes independent of conscious will,” Experimental Brain Research. Sep; 229(3) (2013): 329-35.

Alexander, P., Schlegel, A., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Tse, P.U., Wheatley, T., “Dissecting the Readiness Potential: An investigation of the relationship between readiness potentials, conscious willing, and action,” In A. Mele, ed. Surrounding Free Will. New York, NY: Oxford University Press (forthcoming).

Schlegel, A., Alexander P., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Wheatley, T., Tse, P. U., “The suspension of will: readiness potential precede hypnotically induced movement,” (submitted).

Alexander, P., Schlegel, A., Sinnott-Armstrong, W., Roskies, A., Wheatley, T., Tse, P. U., “Readiness potentials reflect non-motor processes,” (submitted).

Kathleen Vohs, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, and Jonathan Schooler

Articles:

Nadelhoffer, T., “Dualism, Libertarianism, and Scientific Skepticism about Free Will.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology: Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility (Vol. 4). MIT Press (2014): 209-216.

Nadelhoffer, T., Shepard, J., Nahmias, E., Sripada, C., and Ross, L., “The Free Will Inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.” Consciousness and Cognition 25 (2014): 27-41.

Nahmias, E. and Thompson, M., “A Naturalistic Vision of Free Will.” In E. Machery and E. O’Neill, eds. Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy, Routledge (2014): 86-103

Nahmias, E., “Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences.” In W. Sinnott-Armstrong, ed. Moral Psychology: Neuroscience, Free Will, and Responsibility (Vol. 4). MIT Press (2014): 1-25.

Michael J. MacKenzie, Vohs, K. D., and Baumeister, R. F., “You did have to do that: Disbelief in free will decreases feelings of gratitude” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. (forthcoming).

Schooler, J., Nadelhoffer, T., Nahmias, E., and Vohs, K. D., “Measuring and manipulating beliefs about free will and related concepts: The good, the bad, and the ugly.” In A. Mele, ed. Surrounding free will. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (forthcoming).

Feldman, G., Vohs, K. D., and Baumeister, R. F., “The freedom that comes with wealth: Money stimulates belief in free will.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. (under review).

Shariff, A. F., Greene, J. D., Karremans, J. C., Luguri, J., Clark, C., Schooler, J. W., Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D.,., “Free will and punishment: A mechanistic view of human nature reduces retribution.” Psychological Science. (under review).

Encyclopedia entries and other short pieces:

Nahmias, E., “Is Neuroscience the Death of Free Will?” New York Times (11/13/2011). http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/is-neuroscience-the-death-of-free-will/ *Winner of Free Will Essay Prize, Big Questions in Free Will, Templeton Foundation.

Nahmias, E., “Does contemporary neuroscience support or challenge the reality of free will?” Templeton Big Questions Online (July 2012). https://www.bigquestionsonline.com/content/does-contemporary-neuroscience-support-or-challenge-reality-free-will

Schooler, J. W., “Does belief in free will make us better people? Templeton Big Questions Online (August, 2013).

Shariff, A. F. and Vohs, K. D., “What would you do if you didn’t have free will?” Scientific American. (forthcoming).
*Winner of Free Will Essay Prize, Big Questions in Free Will, Templeton Foundation.